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Kin Selection and Its Discontents
David C. Queller*y
Kin selection is a core aspect of social evolution theory, but a small number of critics
have recently challenged it. Here I address these criticisms and show that kin selection
remains an important explanation for much (though not all) social evolution. I show how
many of the criticisms rest on historical idiosyncrasies of the way the field happened to
develop, rather than on the real logic and evidence.
1. Introduction. Kin selection is one of the foundations of modern evolu-
tionary biology. It explains how selection works when individuals affect not
only their own fitness but also the fitness of relatives. This is often summa-
rized by Hamilton’s inclusive fitness rule, which sums up all of these fitness
effects, after multiplying each by relatedness of the actor to the recipient
(Hamilton 1964). If this inclusive fitness effect is greater than zero, the trait
will be favored. A key case is the evolution of altruism, which is otherwise
problematic; altruism evolves if –c 1 rb > 0, where c is the fitness cost to
the altruist, b the fitness gain to its beneficiary, and r their relatedness.
In a series of recent papers, E. O. Wilson (Wilson and Hölldobler 2005;
Wilson 2008, 2012; Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson 2010) and a few others
(Alonso 1998; Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; Hunt 2007) have criticized
the theoryof kinselection.Thisarticle isa response to thosecriticisms.Mydis-
cussion partially overlaps with previous comments (Foster, Wenseleers, and
Ratnieks 2006a; Abbot et al. 2011; Boomsma et al. 2011; Bourke 2011b;
Ferriere and Michod 2011; Herre and Wcislo 2011; Strassmann et al. 2011)
but also explores additional interesting points about kin selection that may
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not be widely appreciated. In addition, I bring two running themes to the ac-
count. First, a number of the criticisms are issues that would apply equally
to other forms of selection. Second, some of the criticisms of kin selection
are more historical or psychological than logical criticisms of the theory and
evidence. Though these factors should not be decisive in assessing the valid-
ity of kin selection, they are interesting from the standpoint of the history of
science, and understanding them may help bridge the disagreements. I pri-
marily discuss social insects, because they have been the focus of the contro-
versy, but of course kin selection applies much more broadly.
2. Does Kin Selection Equal Inclusive Fitness? Hamilton (1964) devel-
oped his method of inclusive fitness to analyze social behaviors in general.
The most novel part involves effects on relatives, so Maynard Smith (1964)
coined the term “kin selection.” Historically, these have often been conflated,
but they are not the same. Inclusive fitness is a method that can describe kin
selection, but also selfish behaviors and, by extending relatedness beyond
pedigree kinship, other forms of social evolution (Queller 1985; Fletcher
and Zwick 2006; McGlothlin et al. 2010; Gardner, West, and Wild 2011).
Kin selection is a process that can be described by inclusive fitness, but also
by other means, including Hamilton’s neighbor-modulated fitness, game the-
ory, population genetics, and quantitative genetics (Hamilton 1964; Michod
1982; Queller 1992; Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998; McElreath and
Boyd 2008; McGlothlin et al. 2010). There is some dispute about how exact
and general the inclusive fitness method is, but that is not the topic of this
paper. That debate is complex and requires some mathematical sophistica-
tion to understand. Its resolution either way would not strike down the core
importance of the process of kin selection, which is the topic of this paper.
Here the issues are comparatively simple and are more biological than meth-
odological. I do assume that Hamilton’s rule using pedigree relatedness,
even if sometimes inexact, is accurate enough to use as a reasonable guide
for kin selection. This is well justified theoretically when selection is not
too strong and fitness effects are not too nonadditive (Michod 1982). It is also
justified empirically by the success of the approach (Queller and Strassmann
1998; Abbot et al. 2011; Bourke 2011a).
3. Is Kin Selection Primarily about High Relatedness? Wilson points to
cases of eusocial insects where relatedness is below ¾ or even ½ as prob-
lems for kin selection (Wilson and Hölldobler 2005; Nowak et al. 2010;
Wilson 2012). But Hamilton’s rule is not just relatedness; it also includes
the costs and benefits. When relatedness to helped young is less than relat-
edness of offspring (½), altruism can still evolve if b/c > 1. Historically, it
is probably true that kin selectionists have emphasized relatedness. That is
partly because it is the most novel part of the theory and partly because,
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with molecular markers, it became the easiest part of Hamilton’s rule to es-
timate (Queller and Goodnight 1989). But this historical quirk should not be
mistaken for the full logic of the theory. It is anyway an incomplete quirk;
kin selectionists have also worked on benefits and costs (see sec. 6).
4. Should We Reject Kin Selection Because of the Haplodiploidy Hy-
pothesis? Hamilton, in addition to devising inclusive fitness theory, pro-
posed a particular extension of it. Haplodiploid genetic systems have odd
relatednesses, including a very high full-sister relatedness of ¾. This could
be why eusociality is common in haplodiploid Hymenoptera (ants, bees, and
wasps), why only females are workers, and why these workers sometimes
rear their own sons but not their own daughters (Hamilton 1964). These ex-
planations became the famous textbook support for kin selection and were
crucial in Wilson’s own longtime acceptance of it (Wilson 2012).
But the professional community of kin selectionists has long been skep-
tical of the haplodiploidy hypothesis. Alexander (1974) pointed to the po-
tential for parental manipulation, and West-Eberhard (1975) argued for the
importance of benefit/cost ratios higher than 1. There are also robust alter-
native explanations of the patterns (Alexander, Noonan, and Crespi 1991;
Queller and Strassmann 1998). For example, any association of eusociality
with haplodiploidy might be due to exceptional preadaptations in the hap-
lodiploid Hymenoptera, such as parental care and the sting. Moreover, these
preadaptations belong to females only, possibly explaining why only females
becomeworkers. Finally, workersmay lay onlymale eggs simply because this
is all they can do without mating. These and other reasons have led to some-
thing approaching a long-standing consensus that the haplodiploid hypothesis
is not well supported (Andersson 1984; Alexander et al. 1991; Bourke and
Franks 1995; Queller and Strassmann 1998).
Wilson came to this view late (Wilson and Hölldobler 2005) and then
drew the unusual conclusion that he should reject kin selection. The logical
error seems simple, as is shown by a parallel case. Darwin proposed a general
theory of natural selection and a host of subsidiary hypotheses. He thought
that whales were derived from bears and, more fundamentally, that heredity
was controlled by gemmules that migrated from the tissues to the reproduc-
tive organs. Both of these are false, but no one rejects his theory of natural
selection on that account. Why? Because both the bear–whale link and gem-
mules were subsidiary hypotheses, and there were many ways for the gen-
eral theory to be correct without them. If the haplodiploid hypothesis doesn’t
work, it may simply mean that other parts of kin selection, the costs and ben-
efits, are more important here (Foster et al. 2006a).
Wilson does raise an interesting point: if a hypothesis was used as impor-
tant evidence for theory, shouldn’t the rejection of that hypothesis be used
against it (Wilson 2012)? This would be reasonable if it were the only ev-
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idence. But a wealth of other evidence for kin selection has accumulated
(Queller and Strassmann 1998; Abbot et al. 2011; Bourke 2011a), some of
which is noted below, so any failure of the haplodiploid hypothesis must be
chalked up to its own special assumptions.
5. Do Kin Selectionists Fail to Consider Alternative Hypotheses? Prob-
ably all scientists sometimes fail to consider and test all alternative hypoth-
eses. Each researcher has limited interests, imagination, and skill sets. The
hope is that the collective interest, imagination, and skill is great enough to
make up for this, but some critics of kin selection feel that this has not been
the case (Alonso and Schuck-Paim 2002; Wilson and Hölldobler 2005; Hunt
2007). The response to this criticism should simply be that we should try to do
better, but the history of the haplodiploid hypothesis provides clear evidence
that it is not a systemic problem. Yes, Hamilton loved his haplodiploid hy-
pothesis, and many textbooks picked it up. But its history shows that even this
most appealing of hypotheses received close scrutiny and skepticism (An-
dersson 1984; Alexander et al. 1991; Bourke and Franks 1995; Queller and
Strassmann 1998).
6. Is Kin Selection Supported Only by Correlative Evidence? Nowak
et al. (2010) acknowledge only correlative evidence for kin selection, pre-
sumably the poor relation of the more noble “experimental.” Everyone rec-
ognizes the advantage of being able to control extraneous variables exper-
imentally, but comparative evidence has an important role, particularly in
historical sciences where experiments may be difficult, or in the early stages
of assessing a theory. For example, consider Wilson’s own The Theory of
Island Biogeography (MacArthur and Wilson 1967). It was a great, path-
breaking work, though based almost entirely on models and correlative ev-
idence, with experimental evidence coming only later.
Kin selection followed a similar path. Early tests tended to be compara-
tive, but there have now been many experimental studies. I do not review
the entire literature here since it is well discussed elsewhere (Queller and
Strassmann1998;Abbot et al. 2011;Bourke2011a), but to illustrate thepoint,
it is sufficient to consider the work of two researchers, Francis Ratnieks and
Jeremy Field, at a single institution, the University of Sussex.
Ratnieks’s work has focused on worker reproduction and its control. The
control is often largely via policing by other workers, who can either let a
reproductive worker’s egg develop or destroy it, allowing only queen eggs
to develop. Under worker policing, workers should reproduce not when they
are least related to colony mates and therefore expected to be most selfish,
but rather when they are most related and not selected to suppress each other
(Ratnieks 1990). Comparative studies uphold this prediction (Wenseleers
and Ratnieks 2006a, 2006b). Perhaps this sounds like special pleading, just
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an ad hoc explanation of why the simplest prediction (low relatedness, more
selfish reproduction) does not hold. But it is not, as shown by additional
work, in this case experimental. Queens were removed from colonies, so that
there was then no reason for worker policing in favor of queen eggs (Wen-
seleers and Ratnieks 2006b). With worker policing thus eliminated, the sim-
pler hypothesis holds; more workers now develop their ovaries more in the
species with low relatedness.
Field has studied a wasp, Liostenogaster flavolineata, whose colonies
have a dominant queen and a handful with workers who are capable of re-
producing, provided they reach the top of the dominance hierarchy. Exper-
imental removal of individuals showed the sensitivity to kin selection costs
and benefits. Removal of higher-ranking wasps causes an individual to de-
crease its rate of risky worker behavior, which might now cost it the chance
of inheriting the queenship. Conversely, when lower-ranking wasps are re-
moved, an individual increases its work rate because of the increased need
(Field, Cronin, andBridge 2006). Such removals, by simulatingworker death,
also bear on the nature of the helping benefit (Field et al. 2000). The survivors
were, as predicted by one hypothesis (Queller 1989, 1994, 1996; Gadagkar
1990), able to carry on and benefit from the “dead” female’s past investment
in dependent young. Grouping thus reduces the cost of early death in species
with dependent young.
This work illustrates how kin selection is supported by careful experi-
mental studies and also underlines that kin selection researchers study costs
and benefits.
7. Must Kin Selection Be Tested byMeasurements of Inclusive Fitness?
Nowak et al. (2010) argue that inclusive fitness is never measured and there-
fore cannot be accepted. But to test a theory, it is not necessary to measure
every aspect of it. The biologists who accepted natural selection in the first
100 years after Darwin did not do so because of measurements of selection.
They relied on other predictions from the theory, as in the kin-selection ex-
amples above. Consider Nowak et al.’s (2010) own model for the evolution
of eusociality. The haplodiploid version contains 17 simultaneous differen-
tial equations and dozens of parameters. No one will ever successfully esti-
mate all those parameters. Nevertheless, one might still test predictions of
the model (although it is hard to find any that differ from kin selection, be-
cause kin selection is implicit in the model; Liao 2015).
Kin selection requires far fewer parameters, so why are there relatively
few direct measurements of inclusive fitness? The main reason is that it is
indeed difficult, partly for reasons that make all measurements of selection
hard, and partly for a special reason. The special reason is that the behaviors
in question are often themselves fitness dependent. Those who choose to be
workers may be in poorer condition (West-Eberhard 1975; Craig 1983). It is
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then inaccurate to use a nonworker’s fitness to estimate what a worker would
have gotten had it chosen to reproduce (Queller and Strassmann 1988). It
means that difficult experimental manipulations need to be done to create a
class of individuals whomake the alternative choice but are otherwise equiv-
alent. This is not a problem with Hamilton’s rule; it is a biological problem
that needs to be addressed under anymodeling strategy. It is a virtue of Ham-
ilton’s rule that it incorporates this biological difficulty and a weakness of
other approaches (e.g., Nowak et al. 2010) when they do not.
8. Is Kin Selection Primarily Dissolutive? Wilson argues that kin selec-
tion is dissolutive, meaning that it promotes conflict rather than cooperation
(Wilson and Hölldobler 2005; Nowak et al. 2010; Wilson 2012). It is true
that, historically, some of the best evidence for kin selection comes from
conflicts. But this is primarily because the theory is easy to test when it pre-
dicts two parties working in opposite directions because one does not need
the more difficult fitness measurements mentioned above. For example,
queens laymoremale eggs, but workers destroy them (Sundström, Chapuisat,
and Keller 1996). Workers lay male eggs, and other workers eat them (Wen-
seleers and Ratnieks 2006a).Melipona stingless bee females opt to develop as
queens, and the workers slaughter nearly all of them (Wenseleers, Ratnieks,
and Billen 2003). Each of these puzzles makes easy sense under kin selection.
They are examples that support the general logic of kin selection and related-
ness, and no reason has ever been advanced for why these examples should
work while more cooperative ones should not.
Moreover, though these examples include dissolutive elements, the role
of relatedness and kin selection in these conflicts is actually the opposite of
dissolutive. Suppose a behavior causes individual 1 to lose c units of fitness
and a relative, individual 2, to gain b units. Hamilton’s rule tells us that in-
dividual 1 favors this behavior if rb > c and individual 2 favors it if b > rc.
Figure 1 shows these conditions plotted in b/c space. Sometimes both in-
equalities are satisfied, and sometimes neither is, but there is a region of po-
tential conflict (r < b/c < 1/r) where inequality 1 is satisfied but inequality 2
is not. The role of r is clearly to reduce conflict. If r 5 0, then there is con-
flict over the entire space (where both b and c are positive). If r5 1, there is
no conflict (1/r 5 r). So while kin selection theory predicts conflict, it pre-
dicts that kinship reduces conflicts. If Wilson’s terms are relevant to kin se-
lection, then direct selection tends to be dissolutive, while indirect selection
via kin tends to be binding or cooperative.
9. Is Kin Selection Just an Optimality Approach? Hamilton’s rule gives
the direction of change, but other approaches are sometimes claimed as su-
perior in also giving rates of change (Goodnight 2013). In general, Good-
night’s paper is admirable in seeing similarities between approaches. But
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the optimality versus rates distinction he sees is just a historical difference
between the approaches, not a logical one. The actual derivations of Hamil-
ton’s rule generally do include rates. For example, equation (5) of Gardner
et al. (2011) shows that the change in genetic value for an altruistic trait
would be Dg 5 (2c 1 rb)Var(g), that is, the inclusive fitness effect times
the genetic variance for the trait. Kin selectionists tend to drop consideration
of the Var(g) to leave Hamilton’s rule, because, as Goodnight notes, they
have been less interested in current selective rates than in adaptations that
have been selected over time. This dichotomy is not unique to social selec-
tion. For any trait we can ask either about its current rate of change or about
its historical selection, and both approaches are valuable.
10. HasKinSelectionHinderedResearchonMechanisms? Hunt (2007)
has claimed that kin selection hinders research on proximate mechanisms.
Nowak et al. (2010) cite this approvingly, but at the same time they argue
that research on mechanisms has flourished without much input from kin
selection. Both are claims about history, not about the logic of the theory,
and both can be contested. Mechanistic research has indeed flourished.
Some of this was more or less independent of kin selection theory—which
is not a failure of that theory—and some of it directly stimulated by kin se-
lection theory. As an example of the latter, consider research on kin recog-
nition. Wilson himself wrote that it “has been shaped to a remarkable degree
Figure 1. Kin-selected conditions for individuals 1 and 2 to favor or disfavor a cost
of c units to individual 1 and a benefit of b units to individual 2.
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by the concept of kin selection,” to such an extent that “rarely in the history
of biology has a domain of empirical knowledge followed so closely and
fruitfully after an abstract theoretical idea” (1987, 7), and that “new physi-
ological processes are more easily discovered when research is animated
by kin selection theory” (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990, 197).
11. Has Kin Selection Hindered Research on Theory? A similar claim
has been made with respect to theory: “Similarly, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, the narrow focus on relatedness has prevented kin selectionists from the
discovery of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation” (Nowak et al.
2010, online suplement, 3). But in fact, kin selectionists have not only been
open to other forms of social selection—they have pioneered them. Consider
Nowak’s (2006) own “five rules for the evolution of cooperation.”Of these,
kin selection was developed by W. D. Hamilton, direct reciprocity by R. L.
Trivers (1971), and indirect reciprocity by R. D. Alexander (1979, 1987), all
kin selectionists. Network reciprocity can be viewed as kin selection arising
from population viscosity (Grafen 2007; Lehmann et al. 2007), a concept
dating back to Hamilton’s original papers. Group selection predated kin se-
lection, but it is probably fair to say that kin-selection thinking forced group
selectionists to bemore rigorous and explicit about the importance of genetic
structure (relatedness). To Nowak’s list, one might also add parental manip-
ulation (Alexander 1974) and the use of game theory in social evolution
(Maynard Smith 1974, 1982). Overall, that seems like an extremely good re-
cord for kin selectionists, though contributions from other approaches have
been valuable as well.
12. Does Cooperation without Relatedness Refute Kin Selection? The
paragraph above gives lie to the claim that kin selection is falsified in gen-
eral if some other process is found to be important for particular cases. In
particular, cooperation does not require relatedness because there are vari-
ous mechanisms for getting a direct benefit out of cooperating that are ac-
cepted and indeed developed by kin selectionists (though not kin selection,
these cases can be covered by inclusive fitness because inclusive fitness in-
cludes fitness effects on self).
13. Does Group Selection Preclude Kin Selection? I cannot review the
full contentious history of group and kin selection. At one time kin selec-
tionists made themistake of saying that something cannot be group selection
if it involves kin selection. More recently, we are seeing the reverse error,
that if something appears group selected, that rules out kin selection (Alonso
1998; Wilson and Hölldobler 2005). Most theoreticians now agree that so-
cial behaviors can be analyzed either in terms of effects on the self and others
(e.g., inclusive fitness) or in terms of effects between and within groups
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(multilevel selection) (Queller 1992; Foster et al. 2006b; Okasha 2006;
Lehmann et al. 2007; McElreath and Boyd 2008; Marshall 2011). They are
different languages that can describe the same thing (even if some debate con-
tinues over whether they are always identical).
14. Does Coercion Preclude Kin Selection? Some researchers believe
that coercion might explain most apparent altruism. Queens or workers might
force their young to be nonreproductive, for example, by limiting food (Alonso
1998), and strong Dictyostelium cells might force weaker ones to be nonrepro-
ductive (Atzmony, Zahavi, and Nanjundiah 1997). These are reasonable hy-
potheses that might explain why some individuals forego reproduction, but
two points must be added.
First, there may be a more subtle mix of coercion and kin selection (Wen-
seleers and Ratnieks 2006b). Awasp that receives a bit less food as a larva
may not be forced to be nonreproductive. Instead, her reproductive poten-
tial may be reduced, tipping her kin-selection balance in favor of rearing sib-
lings (West-Eberhard 1975) provided that limited food does not equally im-
pede worker effectiveness (Craig 1983).
Second, even complete coercion cannot explain the full evolution of com-
plex helping. Simple helping could emerge immediately via spring-loaded
preadaptations (Alonso 1998; Nowak et al. 2010); a nonreproductive daugh-
ter might use her preexisting behavioral programs for foraging and feeding
on behalf of siblings. But, in the absence of kin selection, further improve-
ment of worker behavior is nearly impossible; a mutation that improves
worker behavior is not passed on unless the colony’s reproductive members
also carry it. Thus, coercion cannot account for the elaborate complexity
of insect societies or for the considerable complexity of Dictyostelium stalk
production.
15. Is Kin Selection IrrelevantWhen Reproduction Is Not a Viable Op-
tion? Social insect researchers who focus on the evolution of higher social
insects, such as honeybees and most ants, may not see much utility in kin
selection as a research program. This may be partly a proximate–ultimate di-
vide, but not solely, because even for ultimate questions, such researchers
may prefer to focus on optimization of colony efficiency rather than kin se-
lection. This is entirely reasonable as a research strategy but is perfectly con-
sistent with kin selection when workers have no reproductive options. They
should be selected to do all they can for the reproduction of the queen (max-
imize rb), and that is usually equivalent to maximizing colony fitness. Kin
selection is still crucial to understand how these colonies reached this point.
Moreover, it is sometimes forgotten that while researchers may ignore kin
selection, the social insects do not. Kin selection and relatedness are still nec-
essary for the evolution andmaintenance of all worker traits.When amutation
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causes a change in a gene expressed in workers, that mutation is selected to
the degree that it helps their reproducing kin, times relatedness. Relatedness
is what causes heritability of worker traits. If there is no relatedness, there will
be no response to selection.
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